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The new DoW reforms replace bureaucracy with speed and outcomes. Success depends on culture and funding flexibility
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s announcement transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System (WAC) is not just a reform; it is the most profound and necessary rupture with the past 60 years of defense policy.
For decades, the Department of War (DoW) operated under the shadow of Robert McNamara’s 1962 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). That model was optimized for one goal: predictable cost efficiency in the Cold War era. Today, the singular metric for success is speed and battlefield advantage. By declaring the old system “dead,” Secretary Hegseth has signaled a decisive shift, implementing virtually every piece of structural advice that defense reformers have championed over the last decade.
This is a victory for speed, risk, and innovation, but the bureaucratic insurgency is not yet defeated. The structural fight is won; the critical fight for culture and long-term financial agility is just beginning.
The WAC transformation is defined by three fundamental, aligned actions that deserve immense credit:
First, the death of bureaucratic requirements. The cancellation of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)—a process that moved at the speed of paperwork, not war—is the most significant symbolic and structural shift. Its replacement, a focus on Key Operational Problems (KOPs), finally institutionalizes the demand for problem-centricity. We are moving away from defining features toward solving specific, urgent warfighting challenges.
Second, the creation of accountable executives. By establishing Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs), the DoW has finally broken the stovepipes that crippled the legacy system. The PAE is the “single accountable official for portfolio outcomes” and is explicitly empowered to make trades that prioritize time-to-field capabilities. This centralization of responsibility and decentralized execution is essential for rapid delivery.
Third, the bridge across the “valley of death.” The Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) is a strategic financial pool designed to fund top-priority KOPs and validated, emerging solutions. This mechanism directly addresses the point where promising prototypes typically die awaiting multi-year funding approval. Money will now follow validated needs, not slow administrative timelines.
The DoW is now positioned to operate at the velocity of the commercial sector, leveraging dual-use technology and forcing both new and traditional industry players to invest their own capital and assume risk. This shift promises to make defense contracting truly competitive again.
While I applaud the cancellation of JCIDS, the success of the new problem-centric model hinges on a critical nuance: the timing of formal requirement writing.
Having led the Army Rapid Equipping Force from 2010-2013, I know that the most effective solutions emerge from deep problem discovery and iterative, real-world experimentation. I used this approach to invest $1.4 billion in new commercial capabilities, finding and integrating solutions for emerging problems facing soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The foundational error of JCIDS was the mandate to write rigid requirements before the problem was fully understood and the solution validated.Formal requirement writing, which locks in technical specifications, must be the final act of the discovery process—an artifact created only immediately prior to scaling the delivery of a proven, tested solution.
The WAC has successfully pivoted the focus to KOPs and established the Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) for rapid experimentation. The danger now is that the old bureaucratic instincts will reassert themselves. If the newly empowered PAEs or the new resourcing board begin writing rigid “formal requirements” too early in the cycle, they will simply substitute a new form of technical rigidity for the old compliance-driven paperwork. The spirit of the reform demands that we embrace this principle: the only true failure is not learning.
Beyond this cultural implementation risk, the long-term viability of the WAC depends on Congress.
The DoW has done everything within its executive authority, but a critical structural hurdle remains: the “Color of Money.” This term refers to the statutory separation of funds that prevents Program Managers and the new PAEs from moving money fluidly between appropriations categories (e.g., between research and procurement). Without comprehensive legislative reform granting PAEs statutory agility, their ability to sustain rapid, iterative capability delivery across the entire lifecycle will be fundamentally restricted.
The JAR is a clever strategic reserve, but it is limited. For the PAE model to work over the long term, Congress must grant the financial flexibility necessary to modernize the underlying appropriations laws.
Secretary Hegseth has laid out a powerful mandate for change, demanding that every component meet a simple test: “Are we accelerating the delivery of integrated capabilities to solve our most pressing operational problems?”
The structural pieces are now in place. We have empowered executives, a financial bridge, and a problem-centric focus. But history tells us that the bureaucratic culture always eats strategy for breakfast. It is incumbent upon the DoW to fiercely protect the independence of its new leaders, and incumbent upon Congress to provide the legislative agility necessary to turn this historic executive reform into a permanent operational revolution.
America’s military advantage—its ability to out-think and out-innovate its adversaries—demands nothing less.
